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1 IntroductionThe transport layer in a computer network consists of clients and servers, collectively referred toas entities.1 We assume that entities can send messages to each other over channels that can lose,reorder, and duplicate messages; this is the typical network service available to the transport layer.Entities and channels can fail and recover. An entity failure is fail-stop; the state of the entity islost except for stable storage. A channel failure means that the probability of message deliverybecomes negligible, i.e. even with retransmissions a message is not delivered within a specied time.Clients can open and close connections to servers and exchange data over connections. A servercan either accept or reject an incoming connection request. (Rejection can occur because the serveris inactive (as in a TCP server that is \closed" rather than \listening") or does not have adequateresources to accept new requests.) Between any client-server pair there is at most one connectionat any moment. This allows a client (server) to have multiple connections open at the same time,with dierent servers (clients).This is a very general model, which subsumes, for example, the \well-known socket" architec-ture. Clients and servers typically represent user-level processes within hosts. But they may alsorepresent hosts, with one client and server for each host.Note that the same client-server pair can undergo many connections over time. We refer to eachconnection attempt of an entity, whether client or server, as a new incarnation of the entity. Thenotion of incarnations is essential for expressing desired correctness properties, e.g. a client incar-nation becomes open to at most one server incarnation. (Incarnations and correctness propertiesare dened precisely below.)Traditional transport protocols, including the well-known TCP[8] and TP4[6], identify succes-sive incarnations by increasing (though not necessarily successive) incarnation numbers from somemodulo-N space2. This means that the protocol must be designed to avoidmisinterpretable in-carnation numbers, i.e. an incarnation number of one incarnation being interpreted by an entity(client or server) as representing a dierent incarnation.Another feature of traditional transport protocols is that an entity stores a remote incarnation'snumber only while it is connected to the remote incarnation. This necessitates a 3-way handshakefor connection establishment [8, 10]. A client that wants to connect to a server sends a connectionrequest with its incarnation number, say x. When the server receives this, it responds by sendinga response containing x and a server incarnation number, say y. When the client receives the1Actually, clients and servers are the users of the transport layer, and for each user there is an entity in thetransport layer. But for notational brevity, we use \entity" (and \client" and \server") to refer to both the user andthe associated entity.2In TCP, incarnation numbers are referred to as initial sequence numbers.2
response, it becomes open to y and responds by sending an ack containing x and y. The serverbecomes open when it receives the ack. The server could not become open when it received theconnection request containing only x (because it may have been an old duplicate, whose acceptancewould have violated the at-most-once correctness property mentioned above).The delay incurred by the 3-way handshake is unacceptable for many transaction-oriented appli-cations such as RPCs. Note that although transaction data can be sent with a connection request,the server cannot process the transaction until it conrms that this is a new request. This has mo-tivated the development of minimum-latency transport protocols, where the server can determinethe \newness" of a connection request as soon as it is received. This is equivalent to achievingconnection establishment with a 2-way handshake.To achieve this, the server has to retain information about clients even when it is not connectedto them. In the above 3-way handshake between client incarnation x and server incarnation y, noticethat if the server had remembered the incarnation number, say z, that the client had previouslyused when it connected to the server, then the server could have determined that the connectionrequest with x was new (because x > z). In that case, it could have become open at once; i.e. a2-way handshake would suce.A server cannot be expected to indenitely remember the last incarnation number of everyclient to which it was connected, due to the enormous number of clients in a typical internetwork.However, a cacheing scheme is feasible, and several have been proposed (e.g. [5]), culminatingrecently in a proposed modication to TCP [2].In this paper, we dene a cache-based transport protocol and determine the relationship be-tween various parameters (N , message lifetime, incarnation creation rate, inactivity duration, cacheresidency times, etc.) that ensures correct operation. The protocol uses an incarnation numbergenerator that is periodically saved on (fail-proof) stable storage. We determine the optimal cacheresidency time for client incarnation numbers, which ensures minimum latency for every connec-tion establishment. This optimal duration depends upon the message lifetime. Client incarnationnumbers can be purged from the cache before this time; the only penalty is that connection es-tablishment for such clients reduces to the traditional 3-way handshake for a period equal to theoptimal duration.Another approach to minimum-latency transport protocols is provided by so-called timer-basedmechanisms (e.g. SCMP[7], Delta-t[4, 11], VMTP[3]). Here also, a server is required to maintainper-client information for a certain duration that depends on message lifetime. However if the entryis purged before this time, there is no backup 3-way handshake. Thus the cache-based approachmay have a signicant advantage in wide-area situations where only large loose bounds on message3
lifetime are available. (See Section 6.)There is an intricate relationship between the modulo-N space of the incarnation numbers andthe handshaking algorithms. Most references in the literature seem to assume that misinterpretableincarnation numbers (often referred to as \wrap-around") are avoided ifN  2L=where  is the minimum time between incarnation creations at an entity, and L is the maximummessage lifetime imposed by the channels.In fact, we shall show that this condition is not adequate. Consider the messages in transitfrom, say, a client to a server. The condition does ensure that messages sent by dierent clientincarnations have dierent client incarnation numbers. Thus the client can correctly interpret theseclient incarnation numbers, because it knows the highest incarnation number, say z, that it hassent. But it does not ensure that the server can correctly interpret these client incarnation numbers,because the server, unless it is already connected to the client, may have an old incarnation numberof the client, say y. The server interprets received client incarnation numbers with respect to y;and the dierence between y and z is not necessarily bound by the message lifetime. Furthermore,the server may send messages containing y to the client, and the above condition does not ensurethat the client can correctly interpret these numbers.With any connection management mechanism, unless a bound is placed on the lifetime of anincarnation (or equivalently, a connection), it is possible to misinterpret incarnation numbers andincorrectly open a connection. In the case of 3-way handshake protocols, the probability of thisis negligible for any reasonable value of N because an incarnation becomes open only when areceived incarnation number equals a local incarnation number. However in the case of 2-wayhandshake protocols, whether cache-based or timer-based, the probability can become signicantbecause equality testing at the server is now replaced by comparison testing (i.e. is the cachednumber less than the received number?). Our cacheing protocol achieves the same low probabilityin both 2-way and 3-way handshakes (by not using cached entries that are \too old").In the following subsections, we dene desired correctness properties and summarize our con-tributions.1.1 Correctness propertiesWe rst make precise the notion of incarnations. Recall that the transport layer consists of a setof entities, partitioned into clients and servers. Every entity has a unique id.4
An incarnation of a client is started whenever the client requests a connection to any server.An incarnation of a server is started whenever the server accepts a (potentially new) connectionrequest from any client. Every incarnation is assigned an incarnation number when it starts; theincarnation is uniquely distinguished by its incarnation number and entity id.Once an incarnation x of an entity a is started in an attempt to connect to an entity b, it hasone of two possible futures (based on messages it receives):(1) At some point x becomes open and acquires an incarnation number y of some incarnationof b (in short we say x becomes open to incarnation y of b); at some later point x becomesclosed.(2) The other possibility is that x becomes closed without ever becoming open.Because an incarnation becomes open to at most one incarnation, this ensures \at-most-once"semantics; i.e. impossibility of two remote incarnations y and z that are both open to x.A client incarnation closes without becoming open either because its connection request wasrejected by the server or because of failure (in the server, the client, or the channels). A serverincarnation closes without becoming open either because of failure or because it was started inresponse to a connection request that later turns out to be a duplicate request from some old (nowclosed) incarnation. Because of failures, it is also possible that an incarnation x of a becomes opento incarnation y of b but y becomes closed without becoming open.A connection is an association between two open incarnations. Formally, a connection existsbetween incarnation x of entity a and incarnation y of entity b if y has become open to x and xhas become open to y. The following are desired correctness properties: Consistent connections: If an incarnation x of entity a becomes open to an incarnation yof entity b, then incarnation y is either open to x or will become open to x unless there arefailures. Consistent data-transfer: If an incarnation x of entity a becomes open to an incarnationy of entity b, then x accepts received data only if sent by y. Progress: If an incarnation x of a client requests a connection to a server, then a connectionis established between x and an incarnation of the server within some specied time, providedthe server does not reject x's request and neither client, server nor channels fail within thattime. Terminating handshakes: An entity cannot stay indenitely in a state (or set of states)where it is repeatedly sending messages (expecting a response that never arrives). (Such\innite chatter" is worse than deadlock because in addition to not making progress, theprotocol is consuming precious network resources.)5
1.2 Our contributionIn this paper, we specify a class of cacheing protocols and obtain the relationship between variousparameters that ensures correctness and minimum-latency performance. Channels can lose, reorder,and duplicate messages, and entities and channels can fail and recover (as described at the beginningof Section 1).In our protocols, each server caches the latest incarnation numbers of client incarnations thathave connected to the server. Connection establishment is achieved in a 2-way (3-way) handshake ifan entry for the requesting client is (is not) found in the cache. Connection closing and connectionrequest rejection is achieved by a 2-way handshake. In addition to data transfer with the connectionestablishment phase, there is also a data transfer phase which can use any of the typical data-transfermechanisms (e.g. sliding window). Closing can be merged with connection establishment, resultingin a connection consisting entirely of a single 2-way or 3-way handshake.Each entity (client and server) has a maximum \wait" duration. If a response is outstandingfor longer than that duration, it assumes failure (of the remote entity or channels) and aborts theconnection.3 Each entity also has a minimum wait duration; a response must be outstanding for atleast this duration before the entity can abort. When a failed client recovers, it can request a newconnection after waiting a minimum recovery time. Thus it is possible for a server connected toclient to receive a connection request from the client with a higher incarnation number (if the clientfailed, recovered, and issued a new request). In that case, the server closes its current incarnationand (optionally) can start a new connection with a new incarnation. The same can happen to theclient: if the server fails, recovers, receives an old duplicate connection request and responds to it;when the client receives the response, it closes its current incarnation and (optionally) can start anew connection with a new incarnation.Our protocols can accommodate any size of the server cache, including no cache at all. However,if an entry is cached, then it must be cached for a minimum time (unless the server crashes),otherwise correctness can be violated; it can be ushed out any time after that but before amaximum cache residency time. The cache can be lost in a crash at any time.Ideally, a server's cache should be large enough to store the latest incarnation number of everyclient that has connected to the server for a period of the maximum message lifetime plus clientwait duration. In this case, the 3-way handshake can be eliminated entirely.In our class of protocols, denoted SC (for Server-Cache), each entity has an incarnation num-ber generator which provides the incarnation numbers for local incarnations. The generator cyclesthrough successive modulo-N values. We assume that successive values of the generator are sep-3Thus, every opening and closing interval is bounded by this duration, as is any open period where a data ack isoutstanding. 6
arated by at least  seconds, and that this suces for successive incarnations to have dierentincarnation numbers (i.e. at least  seconds elapses between incarnation creations at the entity).Thus the generator can be a counter that is incremented by 1 for each new incarnation. It can alsobe a real-time clock with maximum rate of one tick every  seconds.We assume that periodically, once every  seconds, the value of the generator is saved in stable(fail-proof) storage. If an entity crashes, then it must wait a minimum \recovery time" that is atleast  seconds before it can request a new connection (otherwise correctness can be violated).Upon recovery, the generator is set to the saved value plus =. This ensures that crashes do notfalsify our above assumption about the generator. Dierent entities can have dierent 's.We rst show that the correctness conditions are satised if and only if the following timingconstraints hold:(T1) cS > WC and rS > WC and wC > WS and rC > WSand rC > C and rS > Swhere- WC (WS) is the maximum wait duration for the client (server).- wC (wS) is the minimum wait duration for the client (server); wC  WC and wS  WS.4- cS is the minimum duration of an entry in the server cache (barring crashes).- rC (rS) is the minimum recovery time for the client (server).- S (C) is the time between saves to the server's (client's) stable storage.T1 is the only constraint we place on the minimum cache residency time, the minimum recoverydelays, and the minimum wait times. It is worth pointing out that T1 does not depend uponmessage or incarnation lifetimes.To illustrate the necessity of T1, suppose that the third condition does not hold, i.e. wC < WS.Then the following is possible (see Figure 8): a client incarnation x becomes open to a serverincarnation u which is not yet open (assume 3-way handshake); the client sends a primary message,receives no ack, aborts (after wC of becoming open); it then immediately issues a new connectionrequest with incarnation number y, which is accepted by u. At this point both x and y have becomeopen to u, thereby violating the consistent connections property.We next show that modulo-N incarnation numbers can be used if N satises the following(T2) N    2L+ WS +max(2WC + CS; 2L+ 2WC + WS; 2L+ WS + I)where-  is (as mentioned above) the minimum time between successive values of the incarnation4T1 does not constrain wS, i.e. allows it to be 0. 7
number generator.- L is the maximum message lifetime in a channel.- CS is the maximum duration of an entry in the server cache; we assume CS > L+ WC.5- I is the maximum duration of an incarnation.For many purposes, I is much greater than WC and WS, and the above bound can be approximatedby N   2L+max(CS; I). Note that the constraint on N , N   2L, is too small to guaranteea correct connection.If a server stores the incarnation number of a client for at least L+WC seconds and there has beenno crash for at least L+WC seconds, then all connections with that client can be opened through 2-way handshakes. That is, if there is no cache entry for an incoming connection request of that client,then it is guaranteed to be a new one (and the server can become open at once).6 In particular,if we make the (admittedly unrealistic) assumption that the cache is never lost in crashes, we canobtain a much simpler special case of the SC protocol that uses only 2-way handshakes.The only drawback with the SC protocols is N 's dependence on I, if one is concerned aboutexceedingly long-lived incarnations, say, of the order of days. If we assume that the probabilityof two successive connections having identical modulo-N client and server incarnation numbersis negligible (this probability is the same as for 3-way handshakes and is  1N2 under reasonableassumptions of incarnation lifetimes), then the following bound which does not depend on I suces:(T2') N    2L+ 2WC + WS + max(CS; 2L+ WS)For those situations where this probability is not negligible, we can completely eliminate the Iconstraint by using an additional cache, referred to as a Lin-generator cache, at either the serveror the client (or both). The entity with the generator cache, say a, stores its own incarnationnumber from its previous connection with the other entity, say b, for at least 2L seconds. When ais next involved in a connection (or connection attempt) with b, if its generator cache contains anentry for b, it uses an incarnation number one higher than the entry; otherwise, it uses an arbitraryincarnation number. We require the admittedly unrealistic assumption that the generator cacheis not lost in crashes, unlike the usual server cache. Given such a generator cache, T2' ensurescorrect interpretation of incarnation numbers, and hence correct operation.We believe the above results are applicable to TP4 and TCP, because our SC protocols (without5CS < L+ WC results in suboptimal performance, as we see below.6WC seconds after the server caches the client incarnation number, say x, the client no longer sends any connectionrequest with incarnation number x; after another L seconds, no such connection request would be in the channels.8
cacheing) use basically the same handshakes as TP4 and TCP7. In our protocol as specied, onlythe client can close a connection; however it is straightforward to add messages for the server torequest closing and to achieve graceful closing (where each side must issue a close). Our incarnationnumbers correspond to TCP's initial sequence numbers; TCP usually generates them from a clock.The fact that TCP uses the same sequence number space for connection management messages anddata bytes is irrelevant. Performance functions such as ow control, slow start, etc., are orthogonalto the correctness problem. There are some dierences between our protocol and TCP (e.g. in theuse of reject and disconnect messages), but we believe that they do not aect the handshakes.1.3 Organization of paperIn Section 2, we specify a protocol SC1, which assumes unbounded incarnation numbers, andprove that it satises the correctness conditions. In Section 3, we rst prove that the unboundedincarnation numbers in SC1 satisfy certain bounds with respect to their intended receivers. Basedon these bounds, we modify SC1 to use modulo-N incarnation numbers, resulting in protocol SC2.In Section 4, we obtain a simplied protocol SC3, which eliminates 3-way handshakes entirely.In Section 5, we present the Lin-generator cache. Section 6 contains concluding remarks and acomparison with timer-based approaches. Details of proofs are in two Appendices.2 Protocol SC1: Unbounded Incarnation NumbersEvery entity (client and server) has a local incarnation number generator that supplies incarnationnumbers for local incarnations. The generator goes through successive values separated by at least seconds. Successive incarnations obtain dierent (and not necessarily consecutive) incarnationnumbers. Thus, the generator can be a counter or a real-time clock. We assume that periodically,once every  seconds, the value of the generator is saved in stable (fail-proof) storage.Consider a client-server pair. The server caches an incarnation number x of a client in two ways:(1) if it becomes open to client incarnation x as a result of a 3-way handshake; and (2) if it receivesa connection request from the client with incarnation number x when its cache has a value y < x(whether or not the server accepts the request). In both cases, the cacheing of x signies that theserver has not connected previously to incarnation x or to any later incarnation of the client.The server does not need to remember the value x after L+ WC seconds since cacheing x. Thisis because any connection request received after that time comes from a later incarnation to whichthe server can open at once8. In fact, we require that it not use the value x after this time,7Ignoring TCP's balanced connection establishment, a feature which apparently is not used in practice.8WC seconds after the server caches x, the client no longer sends any connection request with incarnation number9
otherwise incorrect operation can result9; intuitively, x remaining too long in the cache is similarto x remaining too long in the channels. Thus after this time, the server just needs to rememberthat L + WC seconds have elapsed since the cache was updated. Note that it must remember thismuch; otherwise it would not be able to distinguish this situation from a post-crash period whenthe cache is lost and a 3-way handshake is needed.There are various ways to manage the cache. To describe them, we dene a (hypothetical)cache entry for every client. The entry equals the incarnation number of the client incarnation which last connected (or attempted to con-nect) to the server provided this occurred less than CS(> L+ WC) seconds ago; or the special value old, signifying that at least L+WC seconds have elapsed since the entry wasassigned an incarnation number; or the special value nil, signifying that nothing is known about the last connection attempt bythe client.A 2-way handshake can be used in the rst two cases, and a 3-way handshake is needed in the lastcase.One way to manage the cache is to store only entries of the rst and second type, i.e. incarnationnumbers and old entries. Whenever the cache becomes too large, some client entry is removed, i.e.set to nil. This approach has maximum exibility in that any cache replacement policy can beused and both incarnation numbers and old entries can be ejected.Another way to manage the cache is to never discard incarnation number entries unless there isa crash. Therefore an entry can be nil only after a crash and that too only for L+WC seconds. Thuswe can purge old and nil values from the cache provided we remember (in a separate variable)whether a crash recovery has taken place less than L+WC seconds ago. If it has, a 3-way handshakeis used when there is no cache entry; in all other cases a 2-way handshake is used.Convention: Throughout, we use a to range over client ids and b to range over server ids.For clarity, we assume that the incarnation number generator goes through consecutive integers0; 1;    . 2Each client a maintains the following state variables:LinGena : f0; 1;   g. Local incarnation number generator. Initially any value.Statusa(b): fclosed; opening; open; closingg. Initially closed.Status of client's relationship with server b. closed i client has no incarnation involved withb. openingmeans client has an incarnation requesting a connection with b. openmeans clientx; after another L seconds, no such connection request would be in the channels.9Another consequence would be that the probability of incorrectness associated with T2' would not be negligible;see end of Section 3. 10
has an incarnation open to b. closing means client has an incarnation closing a connectionwith b.Lina(b): fnilg [ f0; 1;   g. Initially nil.Local incarnation number. nil if Statusa(b) = closed. Otherwise identies client incarnationinvolved with server b.Dina(b): fnilg [ f0; 1;   g. Initially nil.Distant incarnation number. nil if Statusa(b) equals closed or opening. Otherwise identiesthe incarnation of server b with which the client incarnation is involved.Each server b maintains the following state variables:LinGenb : f0; 1;   g. Local incarnation number generator. Initially any value.Statusb(a): fclosed; opening; openg. Initially closed.Status of server's relationship with client a. closed i server has no incarnation involvedwith a. opening means server has an incarnation accepting a connection request from a.open means server has an incarnation open to a.Linb(a): fnilg [ f0; 1;   g. Initially nil.Local incarnation number. nil if Statusb(a) = closed. Otherwise identies server incarna-tion involved with client a.Dinb(a): fnilg [ f0; 1;   g. Initially nil.Distant incarnation number. nil if Statusb(a) = closed. Otherwise identies the incarnationof client a with which the server incarnation is involved.Cacheb(a): fnil; oldg [ f0; 1;   g. Initially nil.Cache entry for client a. (The meaning of the values have been described above.) Note thatif the server is open and Cacheb(a) 6= old, then Cacheb(a) = Dinb(a) 6= nil.We next describe the messages exchanged between clients and servers. Each message is ofthe form (M; sid; rid; sin; rin), where M is the type of the message, sid is the sender's id, rid isthe intended receiver's id, sin is the sender's incarnation number, and rin is the intended re-ceiver's incarnation number. In some messages, sin or rin may be absent. For notational brevity,we have omitted the optional data elds in messages, and messages related to the data transferphase.10 (Concerning the analysis of misinterpretable incarnation numbers, data transfer messagesare equivalent to the DR and DRACK messages dened below.)10Such messages contain all the elds mentioned above and additional elds such as sliding window sequencenumbers and size. It is trivial to add the data transfer function to the connection management protocol dened here[9]. 11
Each message is either a primary message or a secondary message. A primary message is sentrepeatedly11 until a response is received or the maximum wait duration has elapsed. A secondarymessage is sent only in response to the reception of a primary message. Note that the response toa primary message may be another primary message (as in a 3-way handshake).We next list the messages sent by clients:(CR; sid; rid; sin). Connection request. Sent when opening. Primary message.(CRRACK; sid; rid; sin; rin). Acknowledgement to connection request reply. Secondary message.(DR; sid; rid; sin; rin). Disconnect request. Sent when closing. Primary message.(REJ; sid; rid; rin). Reject response to a connection request reply (CRR) which is received whenclosed. The sin of the received CRR is used as the value of rin. Secondary message.The messages sent by servers are as follows:(CRR; sid; rid; sin; rin). Reply to connection request in 3-way handshake. Sent when opening.Primary message.(CRACK; sid; rid; sin; rin). Acknowledgement to connection request in 2-way handshake. Sent ifcache has entry for sid. Secondary message.(DRACK; sid; rid; sin; rin). Response to disconnect request. Secondary message.(REJ; sid; rid; rin). Reject response to a CR received when closed. The sin of the received messageis used as the value of rin. Secondary message.Figures 3 and 4 illustrate connection establishment by 3-way and 2-way handshakes. Figures 5and 6 illustrate connection rejection.The events of client a are shown in Figure 1, and the events of server b are shown in Figure 2.There are two types of events. A \nonreceive" event has an enabling condition (ec) and an action(ac); the action can be executed whenever the event is enabled. A receive event for a messagehas only an action; it is executed whenever the message is received. We assume that LinGen isincremented by one between successive reads (by an event not shown). We use abbreviations likesin > Cacheb(a) 62 fnil; oldg to denote Cacheb(a) 62 fnil; oldg ^ sin > Cacheb(a).Failure model: An entity (client or server) can fail and recover at any time. All state infor-mation except for stable storage is lost in a failure, and no events are executed while failed. Uponrecovery, the entity reinitializes the Status, Lin and Din for every remote entity, and sets LinGento the value in stable storage plus =. The channels can fail and recover at any time. When thechannels are not failed, a primary message is delivered and its response received within the primarymessage sender's maximum wait time (the channels can still lose, reorder, and duplicate messages).11according to some retransmission policy guided by ow control needs.12
2 Theorem 1. Protocol SC1 satises the correctness properties of consistent connections,consistent data-transfer, progress, and terminating handshakes, assuming the following:(T1') cS > WC and rS > WC and wC > WS and rC > WS 2The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix A. Figures 7 and 8 show how the consistent-connectionsproperty can be falsied if T1' does not hold. Note that T1' is T1 without the conditions on Sand C; these conditions are used in the next section.3 Protocol SC2: Modulo-N Incarnation NumbersWe rst determine conditions under which we can replace the unbounded incarnation numbers bymodulo-N values, for some N .To illustrate the approach, let's consider the sin numbers from client a received at server b. Inprotocol SC1, if the server receives an sin value, it tests sin against Dinb(a); there are two possibleoutcomes: sin = Dinb(a) and sin > Dinb(a) (depending on the message received and the state ofthe server). If we replace sin by sin mod N , we must also replace each test by an equivalent testfor the same purpose.We can do this if sin is within xed bounds of Dinb(a), i.e. if sin 2 [Dinb(a) K1;    ; Dinb(a)+K2] for some K1 and K2. In this case, we can replace sin by sin mod N provided N > K1 + K2 sothat there is no ambiguity. Then the test sin = Dinb(a) becomes the test sin = Dinb(a) mod N .The test sin > Dinb(a) becomes sin 2 [(Dinb(a) K1) mod N;    ; (Dinb(a) +K2) mod N ].The same treatment is needed for the rin numbers, which are compared against the server'sLinb(a). And the same has to be done at the client side. In short, we need to determine conditionsunder which we can bound the sin and rin numbers received by an entity relative to the entity'sDin and Lin variables.We have the following result. Recall that- L is the maximum message lifetime in a channel.- WC (WS) is the maximum wait duration for the client (server).- CS is the maximum duration of an entry in a server cache.-  is the minimum time between successive incarnation generations.- I is the maximum lifetime of an incarnation.Lemma 1. Protocol SC1 satises the following properties assuming(T1) cS > WC, rS > WC, wC > WS, rC > WS, rC > C, rS > S.(a) Every sin in a CR received at server b when open or closed with Cacheb(a) 6= fnil; oldg13
satisessin 2 [Cacheb(a)  L+WC ;    ; Cacheb(a) + L+WC+CS+WS ](b) Every sin in a CR received at server b when opening satisessin 2 [Dinb(a)  L+WC ;    ; Dinb(a) + L+WC+WS ](c) Every sin in a CRRACK received at server b when opening satisessin 2 [Dinb(a)  3L+WC+WS ;    ; Dinb(a) + L+WC+WS ](d) Every sin in a DR received at server b when open satisessin 2 [Dinb(a)  L+I ;    ; Dinb(a)](e) Every sin in a CRR received at client a when open satisessin 2 [Dina(b)  L+WS ;    ; Dina(b) + 2L+WC+WS ](f) Every sin in a DRACK received at client a when open satisessin 2 [Dina(b)  2L+I+WS ;    ; Dina(b) + 2L+WS ](g) Every rin in a REJ or CRRACK received at server b satisesrin 2 [Linb(a)  2L+WS ;    ; Linb(a)](h) Every rin in a DR received at server b when server is open satisesrin 2 [Linb(a)  L+WS+I ;    ; Linb(a)](i) Every rin in a REJ or CRACK received at client a satisesrin 2 [Lina(b)  2L+WC ;    ; Lina(b)](j) Every rin in a CRR received at client a satisesrin 2 [Lina(b)  2L+WS+WC ;    ; Lina(b)](k) Every rin in a DRACK received at client a satisesrin 2 [Lina(b)  2L+I ;    ; Lina(b)] 2The proof of Lemma is in Appendix B. The above bounds are tight. That is, for each bound,if the bound is made any tighter, there is a behavior, easily obtained by exploiting the worst-casereal-time constraints, that will violate it (Appendix B illustrates this for the upper bound in (a)).We obtain protocol SC2 by replacing the unbounded incarnation numbers in protocol SC1 bymodulo-N values. Lemma 1 tells us the minimum value of N to ensure no misinterpretation ofincarnation numbers. Specically, for an sin (or rin) in [A   K1; A + K2], we must haveN > K1 + K2 to avoid ambiguity. From the constraints (a)-(k) of Lemma 1, we obtain thefollowing lower bounds on N  :(a) 2L+ 2WC + CS + WS(b) 2L+ 2WC + WS (subsumed by (a))14
(c) 4L+ 2WC + 2WS(d) L+ I (subsumed by (f))(e) 3L+ WC + 2WS (subsumed by (c))(f) 4L+ I+ 2WS(g) 2L+ WS (subsumed by (c))(h) L+ WS + I (subsumed by (f))(i) 2L+ WC (subsumed by (c))(j) 2L+ WS + WC (subsumed by (c))(k) 2L+ I (subsumed by (f))Combining the above bounds, we obtain:(T2) N    2L+ WS +max(2WC + CS; 2L+ 2WC + WS; 2L+ WS + I) 2We obtain protocol SC2 by modifying SC1 as follows: Redene the domains of variables LinGena, Lina(b), Dina(b), LinGenb, Linb(a), Dinb(a),Cacheb(a) 6= fnil; oldg, and message elds sin and rin to be f0; : : : ; N   1g Every test of equality involving these variables and elds (e.g. sin = Dinb(a)) is unchanged(but now each side is a modulo-N number). Replace the test sin > Cacheb(a) in the server when closed or open by1  sin	 Cacheb(a)  L+WC+CS+WS(obtained from part (a) of Lemma 1) where 	 is the modulo-N subtraction. Replace the test sin > Dinb(a) in the server when opening by1  sin	 Dinb(a)  L+WC+WS(obtained from part (b) of Lemma 1). Replace the test sin > Dina(b) in the client when open by1  sin	 Dina(b)  2L+WC+WS(obtained from part (e) of Lemma 1).With all these constraints satised, similar to that of Theorem 1, we can prove the correctnessproperties of SC2:Theorem 2. Protocol SC2 satises the correctness properties provided N satises T1 andT2. 2Almost always, I is much greater than WC and WS. Then the bound T2 approximates toN    2L+ max(CS; I)15
Typically, I is also much greater than L and CS , and the above bound simplies toN    IFor example, if we use 32-bit incarnation numbers (N = 232) and assume a maximum incar-nation generation rate of 104 incarnations per second, then the above bound requires incarnationlifetimes to be less than 100 hours.Observe from Lemma 1 that the I constraint enters the bound T2 through the DR and DRACKmessages. In each of these messages, when an entity receives the message it tests for sin =Din ^ rin = Lin. Thus, misinterpretation can occur only if client and server incarnation numbersin the current connection are exactly the same as client and server incarnation numbers in theprevious (long-lived) connection. The probability of this is very low. Specically, the probabilitythat the client's new incarnation number equals its old incarnation number is approximately 1N ,assuming that the duration of an incarnation is uniformly random. The corresponding probabilityfor the server is also approximately 1N under similar assumptions. Thus the overall probabilityis at most 1N , and approximately 1N2 if the start times of the client and server incarnations areindependent.If we are willing to live with this probability of misinterpretation, then we get the followinglower bound on N (by ignoring the I constraint):(T2') N    2L+ 2WC + WS + max(CS; 2L+ WS) 24 Protocol SC3: 2-way HandshakesProtocol SC3 is obtained from protocol SC2 by requiring the following additional constraints:(T3) Each cache entry is stored for at least L+ WC seconds, andNo cache entry is lost due to crash. 2It is clear from section 2 that this means that Cacheb(a) is never nil. Thus the server completelyavoids 3-way handshakes and the opening state. Protocol SC2 can then be simplied as follows toobtain protocol SC3: Remove all clauses in server b whose guard contains Statusb(a) = opening. Remove the SendCRR event in server b. Remove the Receive(CRR) event in client a. Keep only non-old entries in the cache. 16
5 Lin-Generator Cache for SC ProtocolsConstraintT2 depends on I because a long-lived connection can be immediately followed by anotherconnection between the same client-server pair. Specically, suppose the rst connection startedat time t1 with client incarnation number x and server incarnation number y. Suppose the clientcloses the connection (just) before t1 + N, and reopens it at t1 + N. It is possible (but veryunlikely as argued in the previous section) that the new (modulo-N) incarnation numbers chosenby the client and server are again x and y, respectively. In this case, duplicates of the DR anddata-transfer messages of the rst connection can be received and misinterpreted as belonging tothe second connection.To avoid this, we require that successive connection attempts by the client to the server (or bythe server to the client) be identied with \close-by" incarnation numbers. One obvious way to dothis is for one of the entities (or both) to cache its incarnation number from its previous connectionwith the other entity, for at least 2L seconds. We refer to this as a Lin-generator cache.When an entity with a Lin-generator cache becomes involved in a connection attempt with aremote entity, it obtains its local incarnation number as follows: if its Lin-generator cache containsan entry for the remote entity, it uses an incarnation number one higher than the entry; otherwise,it uses an arbitrary incarnation number.To see why this works, consider client a and server b. Suppose client a maintains a Lin-generatorcache. If server b receives a DR (or data-transfer) message when it is open, the sin in the messagesatises Dinb(a)   L  sin  Dinb(a). If the client a receives a DRACK (or data-transfer) messagewhen it is open or closing, the rin in the message satises Lina(b)   2L  rin  Lina(b). ThusN    2L ensures no misinterpretation, and this bound is implied by T2.The same argument holds if server b maintains a Lin-generator cache (and the client doesnot), except that now DR messages are distinguished by their rin elds, and DRACK messages aredistinguished by their sin elds.6 ConclusionsWe have presented a transport protocol that uses server cacheing to achieve 2-way handshakeconnection establishment, providing the minimum latency needed for transaction-oriented userssuch as RPCs. When no cache entry is available, the protocol degenerates to 3-way handshakes.By having a suciently large cache, 3-way handshakes can be eliminated entirely, i.e. if cacheentries are retained for L + WC seconds. Our protocols tolerate crashes, assuming a stable storagethat is periodically updated with the current value of the incarnation number generator. If theserver cache is lost, then 3-way handshakes have to be used until L + WC seconds elapses. Upon17
recovery an entity is subjected to only a brief delay, i.e. the maximum wait duration of the otherentity; this delay does not depend on message or incarnation lifetimes.Note that there is a distinction between message lifetime (L) and message delay. The lifetime isthe maximum duration for which a message may survive, whereas the delay is the average time fora message to go from sender to receiver. The delay is less than the lifetime, sometimes by severalorders especially in internetworks. Certainly WC should be larger than twice the delay but it can bemuch less than the lifetime.Our protocol uses modulo-N numbers to identify incarnations. We have obtained the minimumvalue ofN that guarantees correct operation. To our knowledge, no such bound has been previouslypresented in the general setting we have considered.Unlike other cacheing protocols proposed [2], our protocol does not use a cache entry if itis older than the maximum message lifetime plus maximum client wait duration. This is key toensuring that even if N does not satisfy the lower bound with respect to maximum incarnationlifetime, the probability of misinterpretation is very low.Timer-based techniques provide another approach for achieving minimum-latency connection-establishment [1, 11, 4, 7, 3]. Here also, a server is required to maintain information on each clientit has served for a certain duration. The duration is roughly comparable to the optimal durationin our cache-based mechanism (the major component in both is the message lifetime).In most timer-based protocols, if a client's entry is removed before the specied duration (e.g.due to a crash or memory limitation), then the server can incorrectly accept old connection re-quests of that client. SCMP [7] is an exception: by assuming synchronized clocks, it maintainscorrectness but it may reject new connections for a period of time depending on clock skews andother parameters. In any case, timer-based approaches do not have a back-up 3-way handshake.Thus one advantage of the cache-based mechanism is that it provides a 3-way handshake asback-up whenever the 2-way is not possible. This allows the server to implement dierent cache-replacement policies that adapt to varying client and internetwork characteristics. This shouldbe particularly convenient for wide-area internetworks where only large loose bounds on messagelifetime may be available. Other than this qualitatively important dierence, it appears dicult tocompare the cache-based and timer-based approaches without a quantitative performance evalua-tion.We point out that the incarnation lifetime, which appears in our lower bound for N , does notusually show up in the analyses of timer-based mechanisms. This is because these analyses assumethat clock values are unbounded. This is not really a reasonable assumption if one is concernedabout correctness. Every protocol has clock values that come from a modulo-N space becausemessages have a xed number of bits for the clock value. One can argue that N is very large and18
can be assumed unbounded. If so, that assumption would be equally valid for cache-based protocolsand would enormously simplify the analysis almost to the point of triviality. But more to the point,such an assumption may be invalid for very high speed networks (i.e. very small ).AcknowledgementsWe are grateful for the excellent criticism given by the anonymous referees and the editor, MichaelSchwartz. In particular, the detailed and insightful comments of referees 1 and 3 gave rise to manyclarications and motivated the present treatment of stable storage.References[1] E. W. Biersack and D. C. Feldmeier. A Timer-Based Connection Management Protocol with Synchro-nized Clocks and its Verication. Computer Networks and ISDN Systems, July 1993.[2] R. Braden. Extending TCP for Transactions { Concepts. Request for Comment RFC-1379, NetworkInformation Center, November 1992.[3] D. R. Cheriton. VMTP: A Transport Protocol for the Next Generation of Communication Systems. InProceedings ACM SIGCOMM '86, pages 406{415, Stowe, Vermont, August 1986.[4] J. G. Fletcher and R.W.Watson. Mechanisms for a Reliable Timer Based Protocol. Computer Networks,2(4/5):271{290, September 1978.[5] L. Garlick, R. Rom, and J. Postel. Issues in Reliable Host-to-Host Protocols. In Second BerkeleyWorkshop on Distributed Data Management and Computer Networks, May 1977.[6] International Standards Organization. Information Processing Systems { Open Systems Interconnection{ Transport Protocol Speci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A Proof of Theorem 1Theorem 1. Protocol SC1 satises the correctness properties of consistent connections,consistent data-transfer, progress, and terminating handshakes, assuming the following:(T1') cS > WC and rS > WC and wC > WS and rC > WS 2Consistent connectionsAn incarnation becomes open at most once. If an incarnation x becomes open to an incarnation y,then x does not become open again to another incarnation. Thus, it suces to prove that there isno incarnation z(6= y) that was previously open to x.Incarnation x at a becomes open to incarnation y at bCase 1: Suppose incarnation x of a started at time t1 and becomes open to incarnation y at timet2 upon receiving a (CRR; b; a; y; x).When y sent the CRR, say at time u1, it was opening to x and its cache entry for a was nil.Assume another incarnation z was previously open to x. Suppose it became open at u2(t1 u2  u1  t2). At u1, z was closed and no entry for a remained in the cache.12If b did not crash between u2 and u1, we have u1 > u2 + cS (because x stays in cache for atleast cS seconds).If b did crash between u2 and u1, we have u1 > u2+rS (because b does not respond to connectionrequests for at least rS seconds after recovery).In either case, because of the timing constraint T1 (and t1  u2  u1  t2), we have t2  t1+WC.Thus x would be closed before t2. Contradiction.Case 2: Suppose incarnation x of a started at time t1 and becomes open to incarnation y at timet2 upon receiving a (CRACK; b; a; y; x).When b sent the CRACK, it had a cache entry, say u, for a such that u < x. Thus no incarnationz could have been open to x (otherwise the cache entry would have equalled x).Incarnation x at b becomes open to incarnation y at aCase 1: Suppose incarnation x of b started at time t1, when b received a (CR; a; b; y) and no cacheentry existed for a. Suppose x became open to y at t2( t1), when it received (CRRACK; a; b; y; x).The only message that x has sent so far is (CRR; b; a; x; y). Thus no other incarnation z of a couldhave become open to y.12Thus z became open by 2-way handshake and the CRACK did not reach a; otherwise a would be open by u1.20
Case 2: Suppose incarnation x of b started at time t1, when b received a (CR; a; b; u) with u < yand no cache entry existed for a. Let b have received a (CR; a; b; y) at time t2( t1). Let x havebecome open to y at t3( t2), when it received (CRRACK; a; b; y; x).Assume some other incarnation z of a became open to x at some time u1( t1). By t2, z hadterminated and y started.If z did not crash, then we have t2 > u1 + wC because z would have sent at least one primarymessage, namely a close a request. (Note that the wait time for the server starts at t1.)If z did crash, then we have t2 > u1 + rC.In either case, because of the timing constraint T1 (and u1  t1), we have t2  t1 + WS. Thusx would be closed before t2. Contradiction.Case 3: Assume incarnation x became open to y at t1, when b received a (CR; a; b; y) and therewas a cache entry u(< x) for a. Then no other incarnation z of a could have become open to x.Consistent data-transferAssume incarnation x of a is open to incarnation y of b. x accepts data only if identied by rin = x.Such data is sent only by an incarnation of b that is open to x. From the consistent-connectionscondition, there is at most one incarnation like that, namely y. Therefore, x accepts data sent byy and no other incarnation.ProgressAssume x of a requests a connection to b at time t1. Assume that after t1, there are no failures andb does not reject requests from a. Then a repeatedly transmits (CR; a; b; x), and from some time t2,this message is received repeatedly at b. There are three possibilities.Case 1: b has a cache entry for a. Then b starts an incarnation y and sets it open to x. Itresponds with (CRACK; a; b; y; x) to this and every (CR; a; b; x) it receives. Eventually, one of theCRACK's reaches a at some time t3; we have t3  t1 + WC, because of no failures. Thus x becomesopen to y at t3. The connection is established.Case 2: b has no cache entry for a, and starts an incarnation y at t2 that is opening. It repeatedlysends (CRR; b; a; y; x). Eventually one of these reaches a at time t3, where t3  t1 + WC (becauseof no failures). At t3, x becomes open to y. And a responds with (CRRACK; a; b; x; y) to this andevery (CRR; b; a; y; x) it receives. Eventually, one of the CRRACK's reaches b at some time t4, wheret4  t2+WC, because of no failures. Thus y becomes open to x at t4. The connection is established.Case 3: b has no cache entry for a, and at t2 already has an opening incarnation y that was startedat some earlier time (due to an old duplicate CR message). It sets y opening to x, and at this pointthe scenario progresses as in case 2. 21
Terminating handshakesEach phase of a handshake is assured of termination because of the maximum wait bounds, WC andWS. There is no innite chain of handshakes (the 3-way handshake is the highest degree handshake).Thus, every handshake terminates.B Proof of Lemma 1Lemma 1. Protocol SC1 satises the following properties assuming(T1) cS > WC, rS > WC, wC > WS, rC > WS, rC > C, rS > S(a) Every sin in a CR received at server b when open or closed with Cacheb(a) 6= fnil; oldgsatisessin 2 [Cacheb(a)  L+WC ;    ; Cacheb(a) + L+WC+CS+WS ](b) Every sin in a CR received at server b when opening satisessin 2 [Dinb(a)  L+WC ;    ; Dinb(a) + L+WC+WS ](c) Every sin in a CRRACK received at server b when opening satisessin 2 [Dinb(a)  3L+WC+WS ;    ; Dinb(a) + L+WC+WS ](d) Every sin in a DR received at server b when open satisessin 2 [Dinb(a)  L+I ;    ; Dinb(a)](e) Every sin in a CRR received at client a when open satisessin 2 [Dina(b)  L+WS ;    ; Dina(b) + 2L+WC+WS ](f) Every sin in a DRACK received at client a when open satisessin 2 [Dina(b)  2L+I+WS ;    ; Dina(b) + 2L+WS ](g) Every rin in a REJ or CRRACK received at server b satisesrin 2 [Linb(a)  2L+WS ;    ; Linb(a)](h) Every rin in a DR received at server b when server is open satisesrin 2 [Linb(a)  L+WS+I ;    ; Linb(a)](i) Every rin in a REJ or CRACK received at client a satisesrin 2 [Lina(b)  2L+WC ;    ; Lina(b)](j) Every rin in a CRR received at client a satisesrin 2 [Lina(b)  2L+WS+WC ;    ; Lina(b)](k) Every rin in a DRACK received at client a satisesrin 2 [Lina(b)  2L+I ;    ; Lina(b)] 22
2In the proof below, we make use of the following property: Over any period of time T , LinGena(and LinGenb) is nondecreasing and increases in value by at most T=. This property is holds evenwith crashes because of the last two conditions in T1 (involving S and C).Bounds on sin in CR received at serverLet the server receive (CR; a; b; sin) at time t1. We rst obtain bounds on sin in terms of LinGena.Let l1 be the value of LinGena at t1. Clearly sin  l1, which gives us an upper bound on sin.To obtain a lower bound on sin, we note that the client sent the sin after time t1   L (becauseof the L constraint). Furthermore, the client incarnation sin was started at most WC seconds earlier(otherwise it would have aborted before t1   L). Thus the smallest possible sin is the value ofLinGena at t1   L  WC. Hence, we have sin  l1   L+WC (using the  constraint).Combining the two bounds, we have the following:(1) sin 2 [l1   L+ WC ;    ; l1]The server tests sin against Dinb(a) when opening, and against Cacheb(a) when Cacheb(a) 62fnil; oldg and server is open or closed. We examine each case separately.Assume the server is open at t1, when Cacheb(a) = d1. Let it have become open at t2( t1).Because Cacheb(a) 6= old, we have t2  t1   CS. The server received the CR to which it opened att3( t2   WS). Let LinGena = l3 at t3. We have l3  l1   CS+WS . We also have d1  l3   L+WC(applying condition (1) at t3). Therefore we have d1  l1   L+WC+CS+WS , which gives us an upperbound on l1. For a lower bound, we have the obvious d1  l2  l1. Combining the two bounds, wehave (2) sin 2 [d1   L+ WC ;    ; d1 + L+ WC + CS + WS ]Assume the server is closed at time t1, when Cacheb(a) = d1. It last become open at t2(t1   CS). The same treatment as in the case of open applies, resulting in the same bounds (2).Part (a) of Lemma 1 follows from condition (2).[Note: These bounds are tight because equality is possible with each of the inequalities above.For the upper bound in (2), the following scenario is possible. The (CR; a; b; sin) received at timet1 has sin = l1, i.e. it was sent just before time t1. The server is open at t1 with Cacheb(a) = d1.It became open at time t2 = t1   CS, and the CR to which it opened was received at t3 = t2   WS.Assume LinGena ticks at max rate. At t3, let LinGena = l3 = l1  CS+WS . The CR received at t3 wassent at time t3 L+WC. Thus d1 = l3  L+WC . Combining these, we have sin = d1+ L+WC+CS+WS .]23
Assume the server is opening at time t1, with Dinb(a) = d1. Then at some time t2 (wheret1  t2  t1   WS), it received a CR message with sin = d1. Let LinGena = l2 at t2. By the sameargument as in the open case, we have d1  l2  L+WC and l2  l1  WS , which give an upper boundon l1; and d1  l2  l1, which gives a lower bound on l1. Combining with (1), we have(3) sin 2 [d1   L+ WC ;    ; d1 + L+ WC + WS ]Part (b) of Lemma 1 follows from condition (3).Bounds on sin in CRRACK received at serverSuppose the server receives (CRRACK; a; b; sin; rin) at time t1, when Dinb(a) = d1 and server isopening (otherwise sin is not tested). The CRRACK was sent at some time t2( t1   L), uponreception of (CRR; b; a; x; y) at time t2, where x = rin and y = sin. The CRR was sent at some timet3( t2   L), by a server incarnation that started at some time t4( t3   WS), upon reception of(CR; a; b; y). The CR was sent at some time t5( t4  L), and the client incarnation y was started atsome time t6( t5   WC), at which point LinGena = y(= sin). Thus, we have(1) sin 2 [l1   3L+ WC + WS ;    ; l1]Now the server became opening at some time u1( t1   WS), by receiving (CR; a; b; d1). LetLinGena = x1 at u1. We have d1 2 [x1   L+WC ;    ; x1] (from condition (1) of the CR case). Wealso have x1  l1   WS . Combining these with the lower bound on d1, we have d1  l1   L+WC+WSWe also have d1  x1  l1. Combining the last two bounds with (1), we have(2) sin 2 [d1   3L+ WC + WS ;    ; d1 + L+ WC + WS ]which gives us part (c) of Lemma 1.Bounds on sin in DR received at serverSuppose the server receives (DR; a; b; sin; rin) at time t1, when Dinb(a) = d1 (otherwise sin is nottested). Let LinGena = l1 at t1.The DR was sent at some time t2( t1 L) by the client. The client incarnation sin was startedat some time t3( t2   I). Therefore sin  l1   L+I . Because d1  l1, we have sin  d1   L+I .For an upper bound on sin, we note that DR is sent only by an incarnation that was open (tob). Therefore sin  d1.Thus, we havesin 2 [d1   L+ I ;    ; d1]which is part (d) of Lemma 1. 24
Bounds on sin in CRR received at clientSuppose the client receives (CRR; b; a; sin) at time t1, when it is open (otherwise sin is not tested).Let LinGenb = l1 and Dina(b) = d1 at t1.The CRR was sent at some time t2( t1   L), by a server incarnation that was started at sometime t3( t2   WS), upon reception of a CR. Thus:(1) sin 2 [l1   L+ WS ;    ; l1]The CR was sent at some time t4( t3   L). Thus t4  t1   2L  WS.Suppose the current client incarnation became open at time u1. Because the client does notsend CR when open, we have u1  t4. Thus the current incarnation was started at u2( u1   WC).Therefore u2  t4   WC  t1   2L  WS   WC.Let LinGenb = x2 at u2. Therefore x2  l1  2L+WC+WS . Because the current client incarnationstarted after u2, its Dina(b) value, d1, equals the value of LinGenb at some point after u2. Therefored1  x2. Combining this with the above, we have d1  l1   2L+WC+WS . And we have d1  l1.Combining these with (1), we havesin 2 [d1   L+ WS ;    ; d1 + 2L+ WC + WS ]which is part (e) of Lemma 1.Bounds on sin in DRACK message received at clientSuppose the client receives (DRACK; b; a; sin; rin) at time t1, when Dina(b) = d1 (otherwise sin isnot tested). Let LinGenb = l1 at t1.The DRACK was sent at some time t2( t1   L) by the server, when open or closed. If the serverwas open, the argument and resulting bounds are the same as for DR, i.e. part(d).Suppose the DRACK was sent when server was closed. It responded to a DR sent by the client atsome time t3( t2   L), and the sin in the DRACK equalled the rin in the DR.The client incarnation that sent the DR was started at some time t4( t3  I), and it opened toa server incarnation started at t5( t4   WS). Therefore rin  l1   2L+I+WS . Because d1  l1, wehave sin  d1   2L+I+WS .For an upper bound on sin, we note that the current client incarnation became open aftert1   2L (otherwise the server would not have received the DR at t2). Thus it opened to a serverincarnation that started after t1   2L  WS, i.e. d1  l1   2L+WS .Combining the two bounds, we have the following (which subsumes the open case):sin 2 [d1   2L+ I+ WS ;    ; d1 + 2L+ WS ]which is part (f) of Lemma 1. 25
Bounds on rin in REJ or CRRACK received at serverLet the server receive a rin value in a REJ message or a CRRACK message at time t1, when Linb(a) =l1. The REJ or CRRACK message was sent at some time t2( t1 L) by client in response to receptionof a message (CRR; b; a; s; r) with s = rin. The (CRR; b; a; s; r) message was sent by the server atsome time t3( t2   L), and the server incarnation s was started at some time t4( t3   WS). Wehave t1  t4 + 2L + WS, and therefore l1  rin + 2L+WS . Combining this with the obvious boundrin = s  l1, we have(1) rin 2 [l1   2L+ WS ;    ; l1]which is part (g) of Lemma 1.Bounds on rin in DR received at serverLet the server receive a (DR; a; b; rin) at time t1, when the server is open and Linb(a) = l1. TheDR was sent at some time t2( t1   L) by the client, when Dina(b) = rin and the client was openor closing. This client incarnation started at some time t3( t2   I), and became open some timelater to a server incarnation that was started at some time t4( t3   WS). At t4, LinGenb = rin.Therefore rin  l1   L+WS+I , and we haverin 2 [Linb(a)  L+ WS + I ;    ; Linb(a)]which gives part (h) of Lemma 1.Bounds on rin in REJ or CRACK received at clientThe argument and results are the same as for server case (REJ or CRRACK), with CR replaced byCRR, and WS by WC. This gives part (i) of Lemma 1.Bounds on rin in CRR received at clientSuppose the client receives (CRR; b; a; sin; rin) at time t1, when Lina(b) = l1 and the client isopening or open. The server sent the CRR at some time t2( t1   L), after receiving a (CR; a; b; x)with x = rin at some time t3( t2   WS). The CR was sent by the client at some time t4( t3   L).Therefore the client incarnation x was started at some time t5( t4   WC). Therefore, we havex(= rin)  l1   2L+WS+WC . And we have the obvious rin  l1. Combining these, we haverin 2 [l1   2L+ WS + WC ;    ; l1]which is part (j) of Lemma 1. 26
Bounds on rin in DRACK received at clientLet the client receive a (DRACK; b; a; sin; rin) at time t1, when Lina(b) = l1 and the client is closing.The DRACK was sent at some time t2( t1   L) by the server, upon receiving (DR; a; b; x; y) wherex = rin and y = sin. The DR was sent by client at some time t3( t2   L), by incarnation x thatstarted at at some time t4( t3   I). Therefore x  l1   2L+I . And we have x  l1. Combining,we have rin 2 [l1   2L+ I ;    ; l1]which is part (k) of Lemma 1.
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Events of client a concerning server bConnectRequesta(b)ec: Statusa(b) = closedac: Statusa(b) := opening; Lina(b) := LinGenaDisconnectRequesta (b)ec: Statusa(b) = openac: Statusa(b) := closingAborta(b)ec: Statusa(b) 6= closed ^ hresponse outstanding for more than WC secondsiac: Statusa(b) := closed; Lina(b) := nil; Dina(b) := nilSendCRa(b)ec: Statusa(b) = openingac: Send(CR; a; b; Lina(b))SendDRa(b)ec: Statusa(b) = closingac: Send(DR; a; b; Lina(b); Dina(b))Receive(CRR; b; a; sin; rin)ac: Statusa(b) = opening ^ rin = Lina(b)  ! f3-way handshakegStatusa (b) := open; Dina(b) := sin;Send(CRRACK; a; b; Lina(b); Dina (b))2 Statusa (b) = open ^ rin = Lina(b) ^ sin = Dina (b)  ! fduplicate CRRgSend(CRRACK; a; b; Lina(b); Dina (b))2 Statusa (b) = open ^ rin = Lina(b) ^ sin > Dina (b)  ! fserver crashed, recovered,Send(REJ; a; b; sin); Statusa (b) := closed; responding to old CRgDina (b) := nil; Lina(b) := nil2 Statusa (b) 2 fclosed; closingg  ! Send(REJ; a; b; sin)Receive(CRACK; b; a; sin; rin)ac: Statusa(b) = opening ^ rin = Lina(b)  ! f2-way handshakegStatusa (b) := open; Dina(b) := sin;2 Statusa (b) 2 fopen; closing; closedg  ! hno actioniReceive(REJ; b; a; rin)ac: Statusa(b) 2 fopening; closingg ^ rin = Lina(b)  !Statusa (b) := closed; Dina (b) := nil; Lina(b) := nil2 Statusa (b) 2 fopen; closedg  ! hno actioniReceive(DRACK; b; a; sin; rin)ac: Statusa(b) = closing ^ rin = Lina(b) ^ sin = Dina (b)  !Statusa (b) := closed; Dina (b) := nil; Lina(b) := nil2 Statusa (b) 2 fopening; open; closedg  ! hno actioniFigure 1: Events of Client a in Protocol SC1.28
Events of server b concerning client aMakeOldCacheb(a) fexecuted between L+ WC and CS seconds of becoming enabledgec: Cacheb(a) 62 fnil; oldgac: Dinb(a) := oldAbortb(a)ec: Statusb(a) 6= closed ^ hresponse outstanding for more than WS secondsiac: Statusb(a) := closed; Linb(a) := nil; Dinb(a) := nilSendCRRb(a)ec: Statusa(b) = openingac: Send(CRR; b; a; Linb(a); Dinb(a))Receive(CR; a; b; sin)ac: Statusb(a) = closed ^ hrejecting connnectionsi  !Send(REJ; b; a; sin);if sin > Cacheb(a) 6= nil then Cacheb(a) := sin2 Statusb(a) = closed ^ h accept conni ^ Cacheb(a) = nil  ! fno cache entryStatusb(a) := opening; Linb(a) := LinGenb ; Dinb(a) := sin 3-way hndshkg2 Statusb(a) = closed ^ h accept conni^ (Cacheb(a) = old _ sin > Cacheb(a) 6= nil)  ! fcache entry, 2-way hndshkgStatusb(a) := open; Linb(a) := LinGenb ; Dinb(a) := sin;Cacheb(a) := sin; Send(CRACK; b; a; Linb(a); Dinb(a))2 Statusb(a) = opening ^ sin > Dinb(a)  ! fprevious Dinb(a) valueDinb(a) := sin was from some old CRg2 Statusb(a) = open^ (Cacheb(a) = old _ sin > Cacheb(a) 62 fnil; oldg)  ! fclient crashed, reconnectinggif hwilling to reopeni thenLinb(a) := LinGenb ; Dinb(a) := sin; Cacheb(a) := sin;Send(CRACK; b; a; Linb(a); Dinb(a))else Statusb(a) := closed; Linb(a) := nil; Dinb(a) := sin; Cacheb(a) := sin2 Statusb(a) = open ^ sin = Cacheb(a) 62 fnil; oldg  ! fduplicate CRgSend(CRACK; b; a; Linb(a); Dinb(a))Receive(CRRACK; a; b; sin; ; rin; )ac: Statusb(a) = opening ^ sin = Dinb(a) ^ rin = Linb(a)  !Statusb(a) := open; Cacheb(a) := Dinb(a)2 Statusb(a) 2 fopen; closedg  ! hno actioniReceive(DR; a; b; sin; rin)ac: Statusb(a) = open ^ sin = Dinb(a) ^ rin = Linb(a)  !Send(DRACK; b; a; Linb(a); Dinb(a));Statusb(a) := closed; Linb(a) := nil; Dinb(a) := nil2 Statusb(a) = closed  ! Send(DRACK; b; a; rin; sin);2 Statusb(a) = opening  ! hno actioniReceive(REJ; a; b; rin)ac: Statusb(a) = opening ^ rin = Linb(a)  ! Statusb(a) := closed; Linb(a) := nil;2 Statusb(a) 2 fopen; closedg  ! hno actioniFigure 2: Events of Server b in Protocol SC1.29
Client a Server b
















open     (x cached)
closed (with no cache entry)
Status Status
Figure 3: 3-way connection establishment.
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x (>y)   open (x cached)
   closed (with cache entry)
StatusStatus
Figure 4: 2-way connection establishment.30
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closed  (no cache entry)
closed  (with no cache entry)
Status Status
Figure 5: Connection rejection when no cache entry.
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closed   (with cache entry)
closed   (x cached)
Status Status
Figure 6: Connection rejection when cache entry present.31
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closed   (with cached entry)
crash and recover
(or abort due to no response)
StatusStatus
Figure 7: Scenario where incarnations u and v of server b become open to incarnation x of clienta. Can be avoided if maximum wait of client is less than minimum recovery delay of server.
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              crash and recover
(or abort due to no response)
closed  (with no cached  entry)
Status Status
Figure 8: Scenario where incarnations x and y of client a become open to incarnation u of serverb. If client crashed and recovered, then this can be avoided if maximum wait of server is less thanminimum recovery delay of client. If client aborted due to no response, then this can be avoided ifmaximum wait of server is less than minimum wait delay of client.
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